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  I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
 omputer network operations (CNOs) famously give rise to a number 
of international law complications, and scholars have duly taken note.1 But 
                                                                                                                      
* Charles I. Francis Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
1. This was, of course, the primary subject of the conference of which this article was 
a part. See U.S. Naval War College International Law Department, 2012 ILD Conference: 
“Cyber War and International Law,” http://www.usnwc.edu/ILDJune2012. It was also 
the subject of the International Law Department’s 1999 conference, “Computer Network 
Attack and International Law.” The papers resulting from that conference may be found 
in COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael N. Schmitt & 
Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (Vol. 76, U.S. Naval War College International Law Stud-
ies). For a sampling of the considerable literature focused on the international law ques-
tions raised by CNOs, see Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALI-
FORNIA LAW REVIEW 817 (2012); Hannah Lobel, Note: Cyber War Inc.: The Law of War Im-
plications of the Private Sector’s Role in Cyber Conflict, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOUR-
NAL 617 (2012); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of 
Article 2(4), 36 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 569 (2011); Eric 
Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEXAS LAW 
REVIEW 1533 (2010); Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 JOUR-













CNOs also raise important questions under the heading of U.S. domestic 
law, particularly when the government does not intend for its sponsoring 
role to be apparent or acknowledged. Those domestic issues have received 
comparatively little attention.2  
This article introduces readers to four of the most important domestic 
law questions raised by CNOs, drawing on my prior work exploring the 
disruptive impact of organizational and technological change on the legal 
architecture of national security activities.3 First, must Congress be notified 
of a given CNO and, if so, which committee should receive that notice? 
Second, must the CNO in question be authorized by the President himself, 
or can authority be moved down the chain to other officials—or perhaps 
even automated? Third, what is the affirmative source of domestic law au-
thority for the executive branch to conduct various types of CNO? Fourth, 
and finally, does categorizing a CNO as covert action subject to Title 50 of 
the U.S. Code (U.S.C) carry with it a green light (from a domestic law per-
spective) to violate international law?  
 
II. MUST CNOS BE REPORTED TO CONGRESS? 
 
The issue with respect to congressional oversight is whether the executive 
branch must give notice of a given CNO (or programmatic series of 
CNOs) to (i) the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (collectively, the Intelligence 
Committees), (ii) to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House 
Armed Services Committee (collectively, the Armed Services Committees), 
(iii) to both pairs or (iv) to none of the above.  
This general topic is familiar to American national security law practi-
tioners from the context of covert action. Pursuant to § 503 of the Nation-
                                                                                                                      
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].  
2. Notable exceptions that address domestic issues at least in part include Aaron P. 
Brecher, Cyberattacks and the Covert Action Statute: Toward a Domestic Legal Framework for Offen-
sive Cyberoperations, 111 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 423 (2012); Robert D. Williams, (Spy) 
Game Change: Cyber Networks, Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action, 79 GEORGE WASHING-
TON LAW REVIEW 1162 (2011); Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for 
Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 591 
(2011); Paul A. Walker, Traditional Military Activities in Cyberspace: Preparing for “Netwar,” 22 
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (2010). 
3. See Robert M. Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 












al Security Act, the executive branch must provide notification of a “covert 
action” to the Intelligence Committees (though notification can be limited 
in “extraordinary circumstances” to the “Gang of Eight”—i.e., the chairs 
and ranking members of both committees, as well as the Speaker and Mi-
nority Leader in the House and the Majority and Minority Leaders in the 
Senate).4 “Covert action,” in turn, is defined by statute to mean “an activity 
. . . of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or 
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the . . . gov-
ernment will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly . . . .”5 
So far so good. It is easy to understand how a CNO conducted for 
purposes of sabotage, for example, implicates that definition at first blush. 
But the statute goes on to carve out a series of exceptions to the covert 
action definition,6 two of which make it relatively difficult to determine—
particularly in advance—whether a given CNO triggers the covert action 
oversight framework. 
First, an otherwise-qualifying activity does not count as “covert action” 
if its “primary purpose . . . is to acquire intelligence . . . .”7 A CNO certainly 
might be designed primarily to acquire intelligence, whether through key-
stroke logging, network mapping, microphone or camera control, or data 
copying.8 But this turns out to be irrelevant insofar as congressional notifi-
cation is concerned, because the National Security Act separately provides 
that significant intelligence activities—including activities to collect intelli-
gence—also must be reported to the Intelligence Committees.9 Categoriz-
ing a CNO as intelligence-gathering rather than covert action thus does 
nothing to alter the obligation to keep Congress informed.     
The second relevant exception to the definition of covert action is dif-
ferent. It encompasses “traditional . . . military activities” (often referred to 
as TMA) and “routine support” thereto.10 When it applies the executive 
branch has no obligation to keep the Intelligence Committees informed of 
the activities in question, period.  
                                                                                                                      
4. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b), (c) (2006).  
5. Id., § 413(e). 
6. Id., § 413(e)(1–4). 
7. Id., § 413(e)(1). 
8. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, State-Sponsored Malware “Flame” Has Smaller, More Devious Cousin, 
WIRED (Oct. 15, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/miniflame 
-espionage-tool/ 
9. 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a (2006).  













Consider first the scope of the TMA exception. The text of the statute 
does not define TMA. This naturally tempts some to assume that the key 
to identifying activity as TMA involves some form of comparison to past 
practices particularly associated with the military. The word “traditional” in 
TMA, after all, suggests precisely this comparison. If that were indeed the 
correct reading, substantial debates would then arise in light of the relative 
novelty of CNOs. In order to categorize a CNO as TMA, one would first 
have to establish that the TMA standard could be satisfied via analogy ra-
ther than requiring a literal precedent showing the military previously en-
gaged in that exact type of operation. If that bridge were crossed, moreo-
ver, one would then have to show that the CNO in question does in fact 
track the relevant contours of some past, non-cyber military operations. 
The history-based interpretation of TMA, in short, invites no small amount 
of disagreement and instability. But it is far from clear that the history-
based interpretation of TMA is correct in the first place. 
The legislative history of the TMA exception is long and dense, and I 
have set it forth in its full complexity elsewhere.11 For present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that Congress and the administration of George H.W. 
Bush negotiated this question extensively, and ultimately compromised by 
adopting a relatively objective definition of TMA.12 Two conditions had to 
be met, no more and no less. First, the activity had to be commanded and 
executed by military personnel. Second, the activity had to take place in a 
context in which overt hostilities either were under way already or at least 
were “anticipated” in the specific sense that the National Command Au-
thorities had authorized “operational planning for hostilities.”13 Historical 
comparisons simply did not enter into the picture, on this view. 
This understanding—if accepted by all sides engaged in an internal de-
bate over the applicability of the TMA exception in a given case—should 
prove relatively easy to map onto CNOs in some contexts. Most obviously, 
any CNO linked to overt combat operations, such as those currently under 
way in Afghanistan, should qualify without controversy (so long as com-
manded and executed by military personnel). Similarly, an operation like 
Stuxnet—involving a potential adversary regarding which it is quite possi-
                                                                                                                      
11. See Chesney, supra note 3, at 592–601. See also Walker, supra note 2. 
12. See Walker, supra note 2, at 340 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-85, at 46 (1991); H.R. 
CONF. REP. 102-166 (1991)). 












ble if not probable that operational planning has been authorized—likewise 
would qualify so long as commanded and executed by military personnel.14 
Why then might there still be controversy with respect to TMA’s 
scope? First, it is not obvious that the objective, negotiated definition just 
discussed is, in fact, widely appreciated within the government, let alone 
widely accepted as controlling. It is memorialized only in the legislative his-
tory rather than the actual text of the statute, after all, and it does not fol-
low intuitively from the words “traditional military activity.” Second, even if 
one accepts the objective test, there remains significant room for disagree-
ment regarding its actual application, particularly thanks to ongoing uncer-
tainty over the organizational, geographic and temporal scope of hostilities 
relating to al Qaeda and the conflict once called the “war on terror.”  
And what of “routine support” to TMA? This too was the subject of 
considerable attention during the drafting of the covert action definition.15 
Rather than adopt specific criteria to explain the boundaries of the routine 
support concept, Congress in the legislative history provided an illustrative 
set of examples. Unacknowledged logistical support for a potential military 
operation would count, for example, whereas recruiting foreign personnel 
or engaging in propaganda would not. The difference, according to the leg-
islative history, was that the latter were riskier activities for the United 
States, hence less appropriate for exemption from the oversight system. 
That risk-oriented distinction can be brought to bear on the question 
whether a given CNO constitutes routine support to TMA, but one should 
expect there to be many circumstances in which reasonable minds can dis-
agree as to the outcome; the nature of this criterion is simply too subjec-
tive, whether we are speaking of CNOs or non-cyber activities.  
 In any event, let us assume now that a given CNO qualifies as 
TMA or routine support thereto. Might there still be an obligation to re-
port it to Congress?  
                                                                                                                      
14. This helps us make sense of what David Sanger reports with respect to Stuxnet: 
 
At the insistence of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the program had been shifted over 
from military command to the intelligence community. That meant that President Obama 
had to review and renew a set of presidential findings that would allow the United States 
to attack the nuclear infrastructure of a country with which we were not at war. 
 
DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING 
USE OF AMERICAN POWER 200–201 (2012). A presidential “finding,” as I explain below in 
Part II, becomes necessary only upon a determination that the activity is a covert action 
rather than TMA.  













On one hand, 10 U.S.C. § 119 does specify that new special access pro-
grams may not be initiated by the Department of Defense without notifica-
tion to the Armed Services Committees.16 This might encompass some 
CNOs. But it would not necessarily encompass all of them, and in any 
event would not require the sort of detailed, high-granularity exchange of 
information that can arise with covert action oversight. Of course, relative-
ly detailed reporting might occur even without an explicit statutory obliga-
tion; the Armed Services Committees and their staffs obviously have signif-
icant leverage, and as a practical matter can demand no small amount of 
transparency if the leadership so desires. At the end of the day, however, 
the fact remains that categorization as TMA or routine support to TMA 
removes the statutory requirement of relatively granular reporting to Con-
gress. 
  
III. MUST CNOS BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT? 
 
Whether a given CNO constitutes covert action has implications beyond 
notification to Congress. The National Security Act not only requires re-
porting of covert action to the Intelligence Committees, but also specifies 
that such activity must be authorized in a written “finding” signed by the 
President. This requirement of a presidential finding serves to constrain the 
executive branch in at least a couple of ways. First, and most obviously, it 
precludes the President from later denying knowledge of what might turn 
out to be a controversial action, thus giving rise to top-down pressure to 
screen out risky proposals (for better or worse). Second, and relatedly, the 
process of generating a presidential finding generally involves input from 
multiple departments, some of whom may have distinct or competing equi-
ties at stake and hence incentive to argue for modification or rejection of 
the proposal.  
Categorizing a CNO as covert action automatically brings these con-
straints to bear. But as I explained in Part I there are circumstances in 
which a CNO might more accurately be characterized as either TMA or 
intelligence collection. What then?  
If a CNO constitutes TMA, the question whether a statute requires ap-
proval from a particular official becomes complicated. At first blush, there 
appears to be no such obligation. And that is indeed the end of the analysis 
for those who reject the negotiated definition of TMA (described above in 
                                                                                                                      












Part I). Those who accept the negotiated definition, however, must go on 
to ask one further question. Recall that the negotiated definition of TMA 
distinguishes between activities conducted in the context of ongoing hostil-
ities and those conducted in relation to anticipated hostilities for which op-
erational planning has been authorized. Under the ongoing-hostilities track, 
there is no requirement that a particular official approve the activity in 
question in order for it to qualify as TMA. But under the anticipated-
hostilities track, the answer is different. The negotiated definition specifies 
that the activity must be approved by the National Command Authori-
ties—i.e., the President or Secretary of Defense—in order for it to qualify 
as TMA in such circumstances.17 
What if the CNO in question instead is best understood as intelligence 
collection rather than covert action or TMA? I noted in Part I that classifi-
cation of a CNO as collection did not alter the obligation to report the ac-
tivity to the Intelligence Committees. The intelligence-collection/covert 
action distinction does matter, in contrast, with respect to the question of 
statutorily required authorization. Whereas a presidential finding is required 
for covert action, there is no parallel or comparable statutory requirement 
for intelligence-collection operations. 
Unfortunately, it is not necessarily easy to apply the intelligence-
collection/covert action distinction, particularly in the CNO setting. The 
code in question may involve a complex suite of tools including not just 
capacities for collection, but also capacities to disrupt or modify the opera-
tion of an infiltrated system or server (as appears to have been the case 
with the so-called Stuxnet CNO directed at Iran).18 The “primary purpose” 
criterion built into the statutory language anticipates such dual-use prob-
lems in the abstract, calling for what amounts to a center-of-gravity test. 
That inquiry is both subjective and dependent upon timing, however. What 
might seem to be the code’s primary purpose might appear to be collection 
at one point in time, and disruption at some later point (e.g., after the pre-
viously latent destructive capacity of the code has been employed). The 
National Security Act, alas, does not provide guidance regarding which 
moment is the correct one on which to focus or whether the inquiry 
should be conducted repeatedly over time. 
 Of course, a statute is not the only means by which a requirement 
of high-level approval for CNOs could be imposed. The President himself 
                                                                                                                      
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 













can issue such a mandate, after all, and it does appear from the public rec-
ord that something along these lines has occurred. A series of media ac-
counts in recent years tell the tale of long-running interagency disputes as 
the Pentagon attempts to craft rules of engagement determining when 
CNOs might be conducted in contexts that could have adverse effects on 
systems physically located outside the United States, with at least some cir-
cumstances marked as off-limits without presidential approval.19 
 
IV. MUST CNOS BE SUPPORTED BY CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION? 
 
CNOs come in many shapes and sizes, some of which are uninteresting 
from a separation-of-powers perspective. Those that are best analogized to 
intelligence gathering, for example, should be relatively easy to explain with 
reference to the same combination of Article II constitutional authorities 
and statutes that justify such activity in non-cyber settings.20 Where a CNO 
instead constitutes TMA or covert action, however, difficult (or at least 
more interesting) questions can arise.  
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that separation-of-powers 
concerns drop out to the extent that a given CNO falls within the scope of 
a statutory authorization for use of military force, such as the still-operative 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted after 9/11.21 
That AUMF famously provides that the President may use “all necessary 
and appropriate force” against those entities or individuals he determines 
were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as entities or individuals har-
boring them.  In some instances involving CNOs, it will be fairly obvious 
that the AUMF applies. If the Afghan Taliban have a recruiting website 
hosted on a server in Afghanistan, for example, a U.S. Cyber Command 
                                                                                                                      
19. See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Seeks More Powers for Cyberdefense, WASHINGTON 
POST, Aug. 10, 2012, at A1; Lolita Baldor, Pentagon Still Grappling with Rules of Cyberwar, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25, 2012, available at http://www.foxnews.com/us/ 
2012/07/25/pentagon-still-grappling-with-rules-cyberwar/; Ellen Nakashima, A Cyberspy 
Is Halted, but Not a Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2011, at A1; ERIC SCHMITT & 
THOM SHANKER, COUNTERSTRIKE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S SECRET CAM-
PAIGN AGAINST AL QAEDA 135–36, 145–46 (2011). 
20. See Williams, supra note 2, at 1167 (“Authority for foreign intelligence collection 
by the United States Government is grounded in the ‘firm foundation’ of the Constitution, 
the National Security Act of 1947 . . . and the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, as well as 
the many congressional appropriations for intelligence activities.”). 
21. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (Sept. 18, 2001). For a detailed and 












operation to disrupt that website rather plainly would fall within the 
AUMF’s scope. If that server is instead located in Dubai or Germany, 
however, and if the organization in question is not al Qaeda or the Afghan 
Taliban but instead some meaningfully-distinct group, things begin to look 
less clear. Prompted by controversy surrounding detention and drone 
strikes, there has for many years been a debate about the AUMF’s precise 
boundaries in terms of its geographic and organizational scope, and that 
debate is growing more serious over time as the center of gravity for 
AUMF-related operations moves away from Afghanistan, the Afghan Tali-
ban, and the core al Qaeda leadership.22 CNOs may have implicated these 
questions in the past; they certainly will do so in the future.  
If a given CNO does not plausibly fall within the scope of the AUMF, 
what then? Many non-AUMF CNOs are best categorized as intelligence-
collection operations, as noted above, and those typically do not raise sig-
nificant separation-of-powers concerns. Other non-AUMF CNOs instead 
constitute covert action or TMA, yet should not be controversial from a 
separation-of-powers perspective either, because they may be supported by 
other forms of statutory authorization or by plausible claims that they are 
within the scope of the President’s Article II authorities. A CNO conduct-
ed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as covert action, for example, 
may rest on the same statutory foundation as any other covert action con-
ducted by the agency: i.e., the National Security Act’s “fifth function” as 
fleshed out over time by executive branch practice, congressional acquies-
cence in that practice and subsequently enacted oversight legislation.23 And 
at least some instances of non-AUMF CNOs constituting either covert ac-
tion or TMA (particularly those that are distant in their nature or effects 
from the use of kinetic force) might be relatively easy to justify as exercises 
of the constitutional authority of the President to conduct foreign affairs or 
to command the armed forces.24  
Is the latter still true for a CNO with significant kinetic effects, such as 
Stuxnet?25 In 2011, the Obama administration contended that its sustained, 
                                                                                                                      
22. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal 
Architecture of Counterterrorism, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2013).  
23. See, e.g., William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: 
The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW 667, 698 (2003).  
24. Cf. Robert F. Turner, Coercive Court Action and the Law, 20 YALE JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 427, 442–45 (1995) (reviewing W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. 
BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION: PRACTICES, CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COV-
ERT COERCION ABROAD IN INTERNATIONAL AND AMERICAN LAW (1992)). 













overt use of airpower in Libya (including both comprehensive logistical 
support to combat sorties carried out by NATO and other allies, and peri-
odic airstrikes using U.S. manned and unmanned aircraft) fell within the 
President’s constitutional authority to act in foreign affairs in pursuit of 
significant national interests, and that this did not infringe congressional 
prerogatives over the resort to war in light of the limited nature of the 
force involved, the limited purposes for which it was being used, and the 
fact that the situation did not entail a significant risk of harm to U.S. per-
sonnel.26 Few if any CNOs would run afoul of that narrow understanding 
of the congressional role. That said, the Obama administration’s theory of 
authority vis-à-vis Libya has been met with sharp criticism, and reliance 
exclusively upon it might be unnecessarily risky.27 If the circumstances war-
rant the argument,28 it would be wise instead (or at least in addition) to in-
voke the President’s constitutional duty to use force in self-defense, a duty 
which if otherwise implicated can surely encompass CNOs.29  
                                                                                                                      
26. See Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 1, 
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
27. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Meet the New Boss: Continuity in Presidential War Powers?, 
35 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 863, 864 (2012). 
28. The precise boundaries of self-defense authority are famously difficult to define. 
Much of the literature on this subject arises in the international law setting. See, e.g., Mat-
thew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States That Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
31 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2009). To at least some extent, how-
ever, the insights of the international law debate can be mapped onto the parallel separa-
tion-of-powers questions associated with the President’s self-defense authority. In practi-
cal terms relating to CNOs, the hardest questions may arise when the government acts in 
an anticipatory rather than reactive setting. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network At-
tack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885, 932–33 (1999). See also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. 
Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARVARD JOUR-
NAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 415, 526–28 (2012); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the 
Law of War, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 87, 90 (2010). 
29. David Sanger’s account of the internal debates of the Obama administration in re-
lation to the use of force in Libya in 2011 raises an interesting question. According to his 
account, U.S. officials at one point considered conducting a CNO that might disable Lib-
ya’s air defense network, prior to overt military intervention. See SANGER, supra note 14, at 
344. The proposal came to naught in the face of technical difficulties, but along the way it 
apparently generated a legal dispute “about whether the President had the authority . . . to 
order a cyberattack as part of a broader military operation without first consulting Con-
gress.” Id. It is unclear how resort to a CNO could possibly have raised different separa-
tion-of-powers concerns than the overt, kinetic measures the Obama administration was 
contemplating, let alone concerns with more bite. It may be that the actual concern in this 












Against this backdrop, one final question arises: For the subset of cases 
in which congressional authorization at least arguably is necessary, has 
Congress already provided such authorization separate and apart from the 
AUMF? This question draws our attention to § 954 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. That statute provides as fol-
lows: 
 
Congress affirms that the Department of Defense has the capability, and 
upon direction by the President may conduct offensive operations in cy-
berspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests, subject to— 
 
(1)  the policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows 
for kinetic capabilities, including the law of armed conflict; and 
(2)  the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.). 
 
The interesting question here is whether § 954 should be read to au-
thorize CNOs in circumstances beyond what would be covered in any 
event either by the AUMF or by a plausible claim of inherent presidential 
authority, or whether instead § 954 merely confirms existing authority for 
clarity’s sake (and perhaps also to dispel doubt that such existing authority 
requires compliance with the War Powers Resolution and various other 
regulatory regimes that would govern Department of Defense kinetic oper-
ations). Section 954 is clearly superfluous as an authorizing mechanism in-
sofar as it contemplates CNOs in circumstances genuinely involving na-
tional self-defense. Whether the same can be said for the statute’s explicit 
reference to “offensive” CNOs undertaken in the defense of “Allies and 
interests,” however, is much less clear.   
On its face, this language might be taken as a standing authorization to 
engage in CNOs for a rather wide range of purposes beyond those for 
which it is quite apparent authority already exists. But did Congress actually 
intend that result? There is reason to believe it did not, though the matter is 
far from conclusive.  
The original version of this section—§ 962 in the House bill—simply 
stated that the military had authority to engage in CNOs on a clandestine 
basis when acting under color of the AUMF or “to defend against a cyber 
                                                                                                                      
from disclosure to Congress (under the War Powers Resolution (WPR)) that the United 
States had engaged in such an operation. Or it may simply be that participants in this de-
bate took the view that a CNO of this kind would amount to the introduction of U.S. 













attack against an asset of the Department of Defense.”30 That language 
would have done little work other than helping to clarify the TMA/covert 
action distinction as applied to CNOs. Later, during the conference recon-
ciliation process, that text was replaced by the language that became § 
954—language that does not obviously speak to the TMA/covert action 
question. Despite this, the explanation for § 954 published by the confer-
ence committee focused on precisely that question:  
 
The conferees recognize that because of the evolving nature of cyber 
warfare, there is a lack of historical precedent for what constitutes tradi-
tional military activities in relation to cyber operations and that it is necessary 
to affirm that such operations may be conducted pursuant to the same 
policy, principles, and legal regimes that pertain to kinetic capabilities.31  
 
Of course, the conference committee report also proceeded to address 
a separate point: 
 
The conferees also recognize that in certain instances, the most effective 
way to deal with threats and protect U.S. and coalition forces is to under-
take offensive military cyber activities, including where the role of the 
United States Government is not apparent or to be acknowledged. The 
conferees stress that, as with any use of force, the War Powers Resolution 
may apply.32  
 
Seen in this light, § 954’s reference to “offensive” CNOs might best be 
understood to use “offensive” in the tactical sense of taking the initiative to 
attack the enemy in a particular instance, as distinct from the larger consti-
tutional sense in which one might ask whether the U.S. government is initi-
ating hostilities or instead acting overall in a defensive capacity. From this 
perspective, it is possible to undertake offensive operations while still un-
der a larger defense rubric, and if that is indeed what § 954 is referring to 
then there is much less basis for construing the statute as a blank check to 
conduct CNOs in otherwise inappropriate circumstances.  
 
 
                                                                                                                      
30. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. 
§ 962 (2011). 
31. Explanation of Funding Summary 146 (emphasis added), http://democrats. 













V. MUST CNOS COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
 
CNOs raise an array of international law issues, including questions of 
compliance with the law of armed conflict and international law protection 
for the sovereignty of States. Strictly speaking, such questions are beyond 
the scope of this article, as I am focused here exclusively on questions of 
domestic law.33 There is, however, an important domestic law question 
lurking in the background when the subject of CNOs and international law 
arises: Does the statutory authority to conduct covert action under Title 50 
entail standing, domestic law authorization for the executive branch to 
place the United States in violation of otherwise-applicable international 
law? 
I previously addressed this question in some detail in the midst of a 
much-longer exploration of the so-called Title 10/Title 50 debate.34 Noth-
ing in Title 50, I observed then, explicitly authorized operations in violation 
of international law, nor did the legislative history of the covert action pro-
visions of Title 50 suggest that Congress intended to confer a standing au-
thorization to act contrary to international law rules so long as the govern-
ment acted covertly.35 There is, though, an additional argument I did not 
previously address.  
The argument arises out of a conspicuous omission in § 503 of the Na-
tional Security Act (50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)). Section 503 specifies that a presi-
dential finding authorizing covert action may not call for conduct that 
would violate the Constitution or any federal statute. It says nothing of the 
kind, in contrast, about compliance with international law.36 Did Congress 
intend thereby to authorize covert action in violation of international law, 
albeit without saying so explicitly?  
It is possible that the executive branch reads Title 50 in this manner, 
yet it is far from certain that it does so. The most recent and detailed 
glimpse into the CIA’s own perspective on its legal compliance obligations 
is a speech delivered at Harvard Law School in April 2012 by the CIA’s 
General Counsel, Stephen W. Preston. In it, Preston provided an overview 
of how his office works through questions of domestic and international 
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law compliance.37 With respect to domestic law, Preston was clear about 
the CIA’s compliance obligations: “[A]ll steps taken must comply with ap-
plicable prohibitions and limitations in the U.S. Constitution, federal stat-
utes, executive orders and other presidential directives, and Agency regula-
tions.”38 He separately observed that “international law principles may be 
applicable as well,” later elaborating that if the CIA were to conduct opera-
tions involving the use of lethal force it “would implement its authorities in 
a manner consistent with the four basic principles in the law of armed con-
flict governing the use of force . . . .”39 Some observers construed this lan-
guage as indirect acknowledgment that the CIA does not actually think it-
self bound by international law, even if it does choose to comply with 
“principles” derived therefrom.40 Notably, in this regard, the speech did 
include a pointed quotation of § 503, describing it as a “crucial provision” 
that “would be strictly applied in carrying out our hypothetical program.”41 
It is difficult to say whether this was a veiled acknowledgment that § 
503 is understood within the CIA as permitting the President to direct the 
CIA to engage in conduct that might violate international law, or if instead 
it merely reflected a disposition to speak more directly about domestic law 
as the primary focus of legal review in such cases. The question does seem 
to matter in practice for CNOs, though, in light of the genuine prospect of 
undesired third-country (or at least third-party) effects. As one anonymous 
U.S. government official put the point recently: “Operations in the cyber-
world can’t be likened to Yorktown, Iwo Jima or the Inchon landing . . . . 
Defining the battlefield too broadly could lead to undesired consequences, 
so you have to manage the potential risks. Getting to the enemy could 
mean touching friends along the way.42” 
More specifically, “getting to the enemy” with a CNO could mean dis-
rupting the operation of a system or server that is physically located in the 
territory of a State that is not an enemy and that might not have consented 
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to the intrusion, with damaging collateral consequences for any number of 
entities around the world who happen also to rely on those systems or 
servers. In addition to posing a policy dilemma, this fact pattern also raises 
international law questions—and hence collateral questions regarding in-
ternational law compliance obligations when acting under the covert action 
rubric. The Washington Post reports that a dispute arising out of such con-
cerns was put to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in 2010, 
resulting in a draft opinion to the effect that “[o]perations outside a war 
zone would require the permission of countries whose servers or networks 
might be implicated.”43 It was not clear, alas, whether the draft opinion 




From a domestic law perspective, CNOs present a host of interesting and 
difficult questions. By and large they are the same questions that surround 
other forms of government activity in which the government’s role might 
not be apparent or acknowledged. This overlap does not mean there are 
clear answers to the questions, however. In important respects, the law re-
mains underdeveloped, and in any event the particular characteristics of 
CNOs at times may make these frameworks particularly difficult to apply.  
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